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Abstract
Quantum illumination is a paradigm for using entanglement to gain a performance
advantage-in comparison with classical-state systems of the same optical power-
over lossy, noisy channels that destroy entanglement. Previous work has shown how
it can be used to defeat passive eavesdropping on a two-way Alice-to-Bob-to-Alice
communication protocol, in which the eavesdropper, Eve, merely listens to Alice and
Bob's transmissions. This thesis extends that work in several ways. First, it derives
a lower bound on information advantage that Alice enjoys over Eve in the passive
eavesdropping scenario. Next, it explores the performance of alternative practical
receivers for Alice, as well as various high-order modulation formats for the passive
eavesdropping case. Finally, this thesis extends previous analysis to consider how
Alice and Bob can minimize their vulnerability to Eve's doing active eavesdropping,
i.e., when she injects her own light into the channel.
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Title: Julius A. Stratton Professor of Electrical Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Communication is the process by which information is transmitted from one location
to another. It is an essential need and a fundamental practice of the world. For ex-
ample, to discuss a business idea with your friend, you might talk to him face to face,
which is a process of interpersonal communication. However, such interpersonal com-
munications is not possible when a long distance separates the communicating parties.
To solve the problem of long-distance communication, human beings have invented
many communication systems to conquer distance. In ancient times, runners car-
ried messages from one place to another. People lit giant fires on mountain summits
or beacon towers, or rang bells to communicate impending attacks. Long-distance
communication became much easier, however, with the advent of electromagnetic
techniques, such as Morse's development of the telegraph early in the 19th century.
Later that century, Maxwell's theory of electromagnetic waves and Hertz's experi-
mental verification relieved the need for wires to carry telegraph signals, leading to
Popov and Marconi's invention of the radio-telegraph technique in 1883. At roughly
the same time, electromagnetic communication moved beyond the telegraph and into
voice communication when Bell patented the telephone in 1876.
The preceding technological advances dramatically improved long-distance com-
munications, but they did not address the fundamental limits on information trans-
mission. Then, in 1948, Claude Shannon published his historic paper "A Mathemati-
cal Theory of Communication" [1], establishing the theoretical foundation for classical
communication systems. Since then, technology and theory have advanced together,
allowing ubiquitous communications-in the forms of fiber-optic networks, satellite
relays, and cellular telephony-to enable the information age in which we now live.
1.1 Classical Communication Theory
Consider a single-user classical communication system whose block diagram is shown
in Fig.1-1. Its major blocks consist of the transmitter, whose purpose is to con-
Transmitter Receiver
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Figure 1-1: Schematic of basic communication system.
vert the information emerging from the source into a form suitable for long-distance
transmission through the physical propagation medium contained within the channel,
plus a receiver that is needed to retrieve the source information from the signal it
collects from the channel's output. Physical limitations in the channel-finite band-
width, noise, fading, etc.-constrain the capability of the system, and communication
theory establishes the ultimate limit on this capability.
Following the source-channel separation theorem, the transmitter employs a source
encoder to convert the source content into a minimum redundancy digital form. En-
cryption may also be applied at this stage, if security against eavesdropping on the
channel is desired. The channel encoder then applies channel coding to the source
encoder's bit stream to ensure reliable transmission over the channel. The receiver
reverses the process used by the transmitter to reproduce the source's information in
its original format.
Information theory establishes performance bounds for source coding and channel
coding. Consider a discrete memoryless source whose content is a stream of indepen-
dent, identically distributed symbols drawn from an alphabet A = {am: 1 Km < M}
with probability distribution {PA (am) : 1 m K M}, then the lower bound on the
average number of bits needed to represent one symbol is the Shannon entropy of
that alphabet
M
H(A) =- PA (am) log (PA (am)), (1.1)
m=1
and the upper bound on the minimum average number of bits needed to represent
one symbol is H(A) + 1 [1]. This is the simplest form of Shannon's Source Coding
Theorem. We can regard the entropy as the expected information content of the
alphabet, and coding to the source entropy limit removes the unnecessary redundancy
in source's output. Shannon's Noisy Channel Coding Theorem, on the other hand,
gives the upper bound on the information that a channel can reliably (without error)
transmit per use. For a discrete memoryless channel, this bound is the channel
capacity, given by the maximum mutual information [1] between the channel's input
ensemble X and its output ensemble Y, namely
C=supI(X;Y), (1.2)
Px
where
I (X; Y) Px,y (x, y) log . (1.3)
YEY xeX
In Equation 1.3, Px (x) is the probability distribution over the channel's input en-
semble and Pyix (yfx) is the channel's transition-probability distribution. The joint
distribution of the input and output is given by Px,y (x, y) = Pyix (ytx) Px (x) and
the probability distribution for the channel's output is then found from Py (y) =
E Px,y (x, y). In essence, the channel encoder adds some controlled redundancy to
XEX
counteract adverse effects-noise, etc.-in the channel.
Shannon's theorems provide bounds for the source coding rate and the channel
coding rate, but they do not provide practical implementations for approaching these
limits. Minimum error-probability detection provides a method to minimize the er-
ror probability the receiver achieves given knowledge of the transmitter's encoding
and the channel's transition-probability distribution. Because this thesis will focus
on binary phase-shift keying (BPSK), we will limit the present discussion to binary
alphabets. Suppose the information symbol before channel transmission is a ran-
dom variable H, and the information symbol after channel transmission is a random
variable Y. The channel is modeled by the conditional probabilities
{PYH (yIHm) : m = 0, 1}, (1.4)
and the source by the prior probabilities
PH (Ho) =Po (1.5)
PH (H1) = p1.
We then find, by means of Bayes' rule, that the posterior distribution for H, given
observation Y = y, is
= PYIHPY|H (y|HO) po
PH|Y (Ho|y) = (y|Hpo + PY|H (y|H 1 )p1
PYH YIH (yH1 pi ( '6)
PH|Y (H1ly) = (yH)po + PY|H (yIH)p1
Error probability is minimized, given Y = y, by choosing the message with the higher
posterior probability to be the one that is decoded. This rule can be implemented as
the likelihood-ratio test
L(y) yH (yH 1 ) HHiPO (1.7)
PY|H (y|Ho) ftHo
where H is the receiver's output.
Error probability is not the only important performance metric for communica-
tion systems these days. Security (privacy) has become especially important, because
of Internet commerce, military and government networks, and personal communica-
tions. Classical cryptography offers two solutions to this problem: private-key and
public-key cryptography. The former requires sender and receiver to share a secret
key in advance of engaging in communication. Thus, its difficulty typically lies in dis-
tributing and refreshing keys-in a secure manner-between distant users. Public-key
cryptography, specifically the RSA system, is the basis for Internet commerce. Its
security relies on the presumed difficulty-in a computational complexity sense-of
factoring the product of two large prime numbers. However, no proof that this prob-
lem is computationally hard exists, and, moreover, it is known that a large quantum
computer can attack RSA cryptography.
Shannon addressed the information theory of secure communication in another
famous paper "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems" [2]. A direct result of
his work is the security of the One-Time Pad cryptosystem. In such a system, the
source's message-expressed as a sequence of bits-called the plaintext is converted
into a ciphertext by modulo-2 addition of a sequence of key bits that are independent,
identically distributed and equally likely to be 0 or 1. Regardless of the plaintext,
the ciphertext is also a sequence of independent, identically distributed bits that are
equally likely to be 0 or 1, making them useless to an eavesdropper. However, the
intended receiver can retrieve the plaintext from the ciphertext by simple modulo-2
addition of the same key to the ciphertext. The problems with one-time pad cryptog-
raphy are: (1) reuse of the key renders the system insecure; (2) the key must be as
long as the message being sent; and (3) means must be found for secure distribution
of the one-time pad key between distant users.
1.2 Quantum Communication
The world, at bottom, is governed by the laws of quantum mechanics that charac-
terize the behavior of atoms and molecules. Most communication systems operate at
macroscopic levels for which classical physics suffices. However, high-sensitivity pho-
todetection systems are limited by noise of quantum-mechanical origin, so determining
the ultimate limits of optical communication requires constructing information theory
in a quantum-mechanical setting. In the narrower context of secure communication,
we noted in the preceding section that a large quantum computer will render RSA
cryptography insecure. It is interesting, therefore, to note that quantum mechanics
also offers solutions to the problem of secure communication, one of which will be the
subject of this thesis. Before introducing that approach, let us briefly describe how
quantum mechanics can enable the secure distribution of a one-time pad.
Suppose Alice wishes to establish a one-time pad with Bob over an optical channel
despite the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve), who can intercept Alice's transmis-
sion in whole or in part. The no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics [3], which
implies that Eve cannot make a perfect copy of the unknown polarization state of a
single photon, provides the theoretical foundation for Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
quantum key distribution [4]. In a simple, ideal description of BB84, Alice sends Bob
a single photon that is equally likely to be in any of the four polarization qubits:
vertical IT), horizontal 1+), +450 1/) and -45' I\). Here we are using Dirac ket
notation for these single-photon polarization states, and qubit means quantum bit.
I$) and I+) are a complete orthonormal basis for the polarization state space of Al-
ice's photons, so too are IA) and \). The relationship between these four states is
as follows
I ) )+I1)
V2\ (1.8)I+|\)
Let us suppose that the Alice-to-Bob connection is, in the absence of Eve, non-
depolarizing. Then, from the laws of quantum measurement, we can compute the
conditional probabilities for Bob's observations assuming that he randomly chooses
to measure the photon he receives in the {I$) ,|I+)} basis or the {I/) , j\)} basis.
In particular, when Alice and Bob use the same basis, transmission is perfect, i.e.,
Pr (Bob = $)|Alice = J$) , Bob uses {I$) ,I ++)} basis) = 1
Pr (Bob = le)|Alice =jl-) ,Bob uses {I$) , le)} basis) = 1 (1.9)
Pr (Bob = |)|Alice = f) ,Bob uses {|/) ,|\)} basis) = 1
Pr (Bob = \)|Alice =|\) ,Bob uses {|/) ,|\)} basis) = 1.
However, when Alice and Bob choose different bases, Bob's outcomes are equally
likely, i.e.,
1Pr (Bob =J$) Alice =|/) , Bob uses {|$) , I+)} basis) = - (1.10)
2
etc.
Because of the no-cloning theorem, and Alice and Bob's randomly choosing bases,
it is impossible for Eve to perfectly intercept Alice's photon without disturbing the
polarization state that Bob will see when he and Alice use the same basis. Thus,
after Alice has sent a long sequence of photons to Bob, Bob uses an insecure classical
channel to inform Alice of his basis choices, Alice then tells Bob via this same classical
channel, for which photons she used the same basis. At this point, Alice and Bob use
their classical channel to exchange checksums to determine the locations of and correct
errors in the bit values ( |) = 0, 1-*) = 1 for the {|$), | +)} basis, and /) = 0,
) = 1 for the {|/) , \)} basis.) when they used the same basis. Attributing
all such errors to Eve's intrusion, they can either abort the the protocol-if that
intrusion is too severe-or, if not, employ the technique of privacy amplification to
reduce Eve's information about a final distilled key to an inconsequential level.
Quantum key distribution, based on the BB84 protocol and other techniques, is a
vigorously pursued research area at this time. This thesis, however, will be concerned
with an alternative quantum-based approach to secure information transmission, one
that is based on another fundamental quantum property-entanglement-instead of
the no-cloning theorem. The approach goes by the name quantum illumination,
and its purpose is to transmit message information at high data rates, not just to
distribute a one-time pad key. The quantum illumination communication protocol is
shown schematically in Fig.1-2. Alice transmits the signal beam from a continuous-
wave spontaneous parametric downconversion (SPDC) source to Bob over a lossy
channel with transmissivity r < 1, while retaining the idler beam (without loss)
for subsequent joint measurement with what she will receive from Bob. Each T-sec-
long transmission from Alice comprises M = WT > 1 signal-idler mode pairs with
average photon number NS < 1 per mode, where W is the source's phase-matching
bandwidth. Bob, for his part, applies BPSK modulation (bit value k equally likely to
be zero or one) to each T-sec-long interval of the light he receives from Alice. Then
he amplifies that modulated light-with a phase-insensitive amplifier of gain GB and
amplified spontaneous emission noise NB photons per mode-and sends the resulting
beam back to Alice over the same transmissivity-r channel. Alice then makes a joint
return-beam/idler-beam measurement to obtain Bob's bit sequence. She does this
with the optical parametric amplifier (OPA) receiver from [5]. It has been shown [6]
Alice ThAuIun state { } Bob
SPDC BPSK'
N signal
{ai_ } idler EeRV{a }olei Eve smk = 0, 1
RCVR aliher
Alice vacnum state {s } Bob
Figure 1-2: Schematic of quantum-illumination two-way communication protocol-
showing modal annihilation operators-with passive-eavesdropper Eve receiving all
the light that does not reach its intended destination. The annihilation operator
notation for the optical modes will be explained in Chapter 3.
that 50 Mbit/s Bob-to-Alice communication with error probability less than 5.1 x 10-7
is possible, in principle, using this receiver for Ns = 0.004, GB = 104 and NB = 104
when n = 0.1. In contrast, suppose Eve (via passive eavesdropping) collects all
of Alice's light that does not reach Bob and all of Bob's light that does not reach
Alice. Then, if she builds an optimum quantum receiver, whose realization is as yet
unknown, her error probability for decoding Bob's BPSK bit has been shown [6] to
lie between 0.28 and 0.46. Moreover, this occurs despite Eve's receiving 9 times the
amount of Alice's transmitted light that Bob does, and 9 times the amount of Bob's
transmitted light that Alice does. Even more surprising, this performance advantage
occurs because Alice's signal and idler are entangled even though the idler she has
retained is not entangled with the light she gets from Bob, viz., propagation loss and
amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise make the two-way channel entanglement
breaking.
1.3 Thesis Structure
In this thesis we will extend and generalize the prior work on quantum illumination for
secure communication in several ways. First, for the passive eavesdropping scenario
examined in [6], we will bound the extra information that Alice receives, in comparison
with what Eve gets, to provide a more complete picture of this protocol's immunity to
passive eavesdropping when BPSK modulation is employed and Alice uses an OPA
receiver. Then we investigate alternatives to the OPA receiver, seeking one whose
performance approaches the quantum-optimum error exponent set by the quantum
Chernoff bound. Finally, we examine M-ary modulation, with M > 2, seeking to
increase the data rate of the quantum illumination protocol with constant bandwidth.
It was already recognized in [6] that the greatest vulnerability of the Fig.1-2
configuration occurs when Eve performs active eavesdropping, i.e., when she injects
her own light into Bob's system and detects some of the modulated, amplified version
of that injected light to determine Bob's message bits. Although suggestions were
made in [6] for minimizing Alice and Bob's vulnerability to active eavesdropping,
no analysis of those suggestions was reported therein. That analysis constitutes a
significant portion of this thesis.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide
background material on quantum optics, the SPDC source, and quantum detection
theory that is essential for the work that will follow. In Chapter 3, we focus on
the passive eavesdropping attack. In Chapter 4, we treat three versions of active
eavesdropping, and Alice and Bob's tools to counteract them. Finally, in Chapter 5,
we summarize our results and give some suggestions for future work.
Chapter 2
Background Material
The dynamical variables in classical physics take on real-number values, whereas the
corresponding quantum-mechanical versions of these dynamical variables are Hermi-
tian operators on a Hilbert space of states. The most important difference between
numbers and operators is the commutation property. In classical mathematics, mul-
tiplication of real numbers is commutative
z1z2 = z2z1 : Vzi, z2 E R. (2.1)
However, if 01 and 02 are Hermitian operators, they need not commute viz., in
general we have that
0102 / 0201. (2.2)
In this chapter, we provide some background material that is necessary to understand
the work to be presented in this thesis. First, we introduce electromagnetic field
modes, including relevant operators and states, and we discuss the behavior of optical
amplifiers and the statistics of different photodetection modalities. Then, we discuss
the difference between classical states and nonclassical states, and present the state of
SPDC light. Finally, we consider minimum error-probability discrimination between
two density operators.
2.1 Electromagnetic Field Modes
Let us begin from classical electromagnetism. The fundamental equations governing
electromagnetic wave propagation in free space are [7]-[10]: Gauss's law
V -6s? = 0, (2.3)
Gauss's law for magnetism
V -poi = 0, (2.4)
Faraday's law
a (poN1
V x E = (2.5)
and Ampere's law
_ 
a (FO79)
V x H =. (2.6)
Introducing the vector potential I (Y' t), and working with the Coulomb gauge,
i.e., V. = 0, we can get the 3-D vector wave equation [7]-[10] from Equations
(2.3)-(2.6),
2 a2( ,t)V29 7, t c2 g~t 0,(2.7)
where c = 1/fpoio is the speed of light. Equation (2.7) has monochromatic plane-
wave solutions, i.e.,
A(F,t0) = Ae-(t*- ± Aj*e.j**-., (2.8)
where k -k = w2 /c 2 with k having real-valued cartesian components, is a frequency-w
plane wave propagating in the k direction. The two terms here are complex conju-
gates, to ensure that A (, t) is real valued. Confining the field in a L x L x L unit
cube, with periodic boundary conditions, we can further get the general solution to
the vector wave equation [7]
1 q-,+ ei~i _ ±W cr. (2.9)
where c.c. denotes complex conjugate, k = i ,, i2]" for integers (l, l, l), and
er , for o- = 0, 1, is a pair of orthogonal unit vectors that are also orthogonal to k r
Equation (2.9) expresses the vector potential as a sum of orthogonal plane-wave
modes whose time-domain complex amplitudes qr e-iw-t perform simple harmonic
motion, i.e., they behave like classical harmonic oscillators. At this point, the transi-
tion to the quantized electromagnetic field is made more convenient by replacing gr,
with the dimensionless quantity ar, = -q. The classical electric field is then
found from
)( , at) =- t (2.10)
at
to be [7]
E (F, t) = j 2L3 T + c.c. (2.11)
Each individual mode can be quantized by treating it as a harmonic oscillator.
As a result, the quantized version of the electric field is
()= j) 2 L + h.c., (2.12)
where &r, is the photon annihilation operator of the 1, o- mode and h.c. denotes
Hermitian conjugate.
For the purpose of this thesis, it suffices to work with a simplified quantum field
description that follows from assuming only a single polarization state of a narrowband
frequency range for +z-going spatial modes is excited. Then, suppressing the spatial
dependence, converting the field to Vphotons/s units, we can write [7]
$ (t) = an -j(wo+2n/T)t, 0 < t < T (2.13)
n=-olo
for the positive-frequency field operator, around the center frequency wo, over a mea-
surement time interval 0 < t < T. The adjoint (Hermitian conjugate) of E (t) is
E+ (t) =e-j(wo+ 2 xn/)t, 0 < t <T, (2.14)
where a+ is the photon creation operator of the nth temporal mode in the field.
2.2 Operators and States
Annihilation and creation operators play key roles in quantum optics. They do not
commute, i.e.,
[ =,+] 1. (2.15)
Associated with & and a+ is the number operator,
R = -a+a. (2.16)
Also of importance are the quadrature operators, which are defined as follows
aia, = 2 
(2.17)
a -a
62 =2. 2j
Operators and states of the modes together determine the statistics of the output
of quantum system. We now discuss some states we use in the thesis. First, consider
the number state In). The annihilation operator reduces the number of the photons in
the field by one, and the mathematical relationship between the annihilation operator
and the number state is [11] [12]
aIn) = v In - 1). (2.18)
On the other hand, the creation operator increases the number of the photons in the
field by one, so applying the creation operator to the number state In) transforms it
into In + 1), namely
a+In) = V'n+ 1In + 1). (2.19)
Combining these two formulas, we can get
NIn) = +-|In) = j +|In - 1) = nIn). (2.20)
From this equation, we can conclude that the number states are the eigenstates of
the number operator. If we perform the number-operator measurement on a field
which is in a number state, we get a deterministic outcome equal to the number of
the photons in that state.
The annihilation operator is not Hermitian, hence it need not have eigenstates.
However, in 1963 Glauber showed that such eigenstates-which he called coherent
state-do exist [13]; he was awarded the Nobel Prize in physics for his work on
coherent states and their properties in October 2005. The coherent-state eigenstate
relation is
aa) = z la), (2.21)
where a is any complex number. Because the set of the number states forms an
orthonormal basis, we can express the coherent states in the number-state basis as
Ia = n n ). (2.22)
n=O
An important property of the coherent states is that they are not orthogonal, and
the inner product between two coherent states is [11] [14]
(a|#) = exp (-IaI2/2 - [#12/2 + a*#), (2.23)
Nevertheless, they form a basis for the mode's state space, albeit one that is over-
complete. In particular, the coherent states resolve the identity operator I as follows,
la) (a = I. (2.24)
The eigenstates of the quadrature operator h1, lai), are other states we will use
in the thesis because of their connection with homodyne detection. The properties of
|a1) are the following
adi jai) = oi jai) ,for ai real (2.25)
(a1|a') =  (ai - a') , (2.26)
J Iai) (aiIdai = I. (2.27)
The number states In), coherent states la), and quadrature eigenstates iai) are
all pure states. Although these states are useful to describe the quantum field, they
are not enough, as most quantum fields are not in pure states. Instead, they are
typically in mixed states, i.e., probabilistic mixtures of pure states. Mixed states are
characterized by the density operator . If a quantum field is in a pure state, |@), its
density operator is p=|@) ($|, which satisfies [15]
tr (P) = 1, (2.28)
tr (p^2 1
where tr denotes trace. However, if the quantum field is in a mixed state, e.g, p =
E Pn| 1@n/) (0,n1, where {P,} is a probability distribution, then we find
n
tr (j) = 1,(2.29)
tr ( 2) < 1
Our work on quantum illumination will necessarily deal with mixed states.
2.3 Photodetection Statistics
Having discussed the operators and the states of quantum fields, we now turn to the
relevant photodetection statistics. We first consider direct detection, whose schematic
is shown in Fig.2-1 [16] [17]. If a single-mode quantum field E (t) = 'e w', for 0 < t <
T illuminates an ideal direct-direction system, it produces a stream of photocurrent
impulses. The total number of these impulses, over the time interval 0 < t < T,
is the detector's photocount output N, which takes on nonnegative integer values
n = 0, 1, 2,. The probabilities to get each individual outcome are [16]
Pr (N = nlstate = = (nI -In). (2.30)
ae-jt
N
Figure 2-1: Schematic of idealized direct detection, q is the electron charge.
The structure of homodyne detection, shown in Fig.2-2, is more complicated than
that of direct detection [16]. In homodyne detection the single-mode field to be de-
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Figure 2-2: Schematic of idealized homodyne detection.
tected is mixed with a strong coherent-state local oscillator on a 50-50 beam splitter.
The outputs from this beam splitter are photodetected and subtracted in a differ-
ential amplifier. After integration over the measurement interval, and appropriate
normalization, the output of the system is a real-valued random variable, ai, whose
probability density function is [16]
p(a1|state =) = (ail -jai), (2.31)
when the local oscillator's phase has been chosen to measure the real quadrature of
a.
Heterodyne detection, shown in Fig.2-3 [16], introduces an intermediate frequency,
i.e., a radio-frequency offset between the single-mode field to be measured and the
strong coherent-state local oscillator.
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Figure 2-3: Schematic of idealized heterodyne detection.
Heterodyne detection allows both quadratures of the input field to be sensed.
However, a1 and a2 do not commute, so they cannot be simultaneously measured in
the observable paradigm of quantum mechanics. Heterodyne detection realizes the
positive operator-valued measurement (POVM) associated with the coherent states
la). In particular, the complex-valued random variable, a = ai + ja 2 , constructed
from the normalized, quadrature-demodulated outputs shown in Fig.2-3, has proba-
bility density function [16]
p (al state = p)= .(a a) (2.32)
2.4 Optical Amplifiers
The quantum-illumination system for secure communication makes use of phase-
insensitive and phase-sensitive optical amplifiers. Bob uses the former in his terminal,
and Alice uses the two-mode version of the latter in her receiver. The quantum single
mode input-output relation for a phase-insensitive optical amplifier is
do = vGa + VG - 12-, (2.33)
where -o is the annihilation operator of the output mode, -1 is the annihilation
operator of the input mode, -+ is the creation operator of an amplified spontaneous
emission (ASE) noise mode, and G > 1 is the amplifier's gain. Lowest noise operation
of this amplifier occurs when the F mode is in its vacuum state.
In a two-mode phase-sensitive amplifier (an optical parametric amplifier), with
signal and reference modes at the input and output, the input-output relation is
hs = V-N&s1 + v'G - 15%so+ R1  (2.34)
&Ro R1 +G - 1h+,ROV"'G I  C &SI,
where G > 1 is the gain.
2.5 Classical versus Nonclassical States
The photodetection schemes in Section 2.3 treated photodetection statistics from
quantum theory. In many cases, however, quantitatively identical results can be
obtained from semiclassical photodetection, in which the light field is taken to be
a classical electromagnetic wave and the fundamental photodetection noise source
is the shot noise associated with the discreteness of the electron charge. States of
the quantized electromagnetic field whose direct detection, homodyne detection, and
heterodyne detection statistics can be correctly obtained from semiclassical theory
are said to be classical states of the field.
Nonclassical states demonstrate some unique signatures in one or more of these
photodetection paradigms that cannot be explained by semiclassical photodetection
theory. Density operators of the classical states have proper P-representations [16]
p= P (a, a) Ia) (al d2a, (2.35)
where P (a, a*) is a classical probability density function, i.e., P (a, a*) > 0, and
f P (a, a*) d2 a = 1. A nonclassical state has a density operator that cannot be rep-
resented by Equation (2.35) with P (a, a*) being a classical probability density func-
tion. Important nonclassical signatures include sub-Poissonian distributions in direct
detection and sub shot-noise quadrature variance in homodyne detection.
Squeezed vacuum states demonstrate the sub-shot-noise quadrature variance non-
classical signature. Squeeze operators are defined as follows
( exp (*2- a+2), (2.36)
where (= re"0 . The major properties of the squeezed operators are [18]-[20]
$ + () = jcs () - (-i
$~ () 55+ () = h cosh (r) - &+eZo sinh (r) (2.37)
The squeezed vacuum state, |(, 0), is defined by
|(, 0) -- S (W)|0) .(2.38)
From Equations (2.36)-(2.38), we can derive the variance of the first quadrature of
the squeezed vacuum state for 6 = 0,
((, 01 A l, 0) 1e-2r (2.39)4
From this result, we see that r > 0 makes this a sub-shot-noise quadrature noise,
because ( = 0 makes |(, 0) the vacuum state, whose quadrature variance of 1/4
matches the semiclassical theory's shot-noise level.
2.6 Spontaneous Parametric Downconversion
One of the major methods to generate nonclassical light is the spontaneous paramet-
ric downconversion (SPDC) process. Frequency-degenerate SPDC generates squeezed
vacuum state light, whereas the nondegenerate SPDC produces the two-mode squeezed
vacuum state light [21]. In this thesis, we call two-mode squeezed vacuum state light
SPDC light. Two-mode squeezed operator is
S() =exp [(*&b -- (d+) , (2.40)
where e is the annihilation operator for the first mode and the b is the annihilation
operator for the second mode. Its properties are
S (() 55+ (() = a cosh(r) + b+e sinh(r) (2.41)
$(()S$ (() = cosh(r) + -+t sinh(r).
The two-mode squeezed vacuum state is
S () 0)a 0),6, (2.42)
where 10)a and I0)b are the vacuum states of the a and b modes.
Another representation of the two-mode squeezed vacuum state can be given in
the number state basis [22]
00 Nn
1 =0 (N + 1)n+1 Il)a In)b, (2.43)
where N = sinh2 (r) is the average number of photons in the a and b modes, and
0 = 0 is assumed. Tracing out the other modes, we can get the density operator for
each individual mode [22]
#a = trb (pa) trb a, +1 In)a(n
n-o (N + 1) (2.44)
pb = tra (pab) - tra (=b E ( +1 Iri)b(nI
n=o (N + 1
Thus, although the two-mode squeezed vacuum state is a pure state, each individual
mode is in a mixed state, which is a signature of the two-mode state's being entangled.
2.7 Minimum Error-Probability Detection
Minimum error probability detection is a much more difficult problem for quantum
measurement than it is for classical observations. Fortunately, there is an exact
theoretical solution for the binary quantum case, the Helstrom bound. Suppose we
want to distinguish between two states, -o and -1, with minimum error probability.
We need to choose a quantum measurement whose outcome will be the minimum
error-probability decision. Let the prior probabilities for this decision problem be
Pr (=po) =1r0  (2.45)
Pr (p= 1 i) = 7ri.
We want a POVM, Mo,M i with M0 + M1 = I, Mo > 0, and M1 > 0, that
minimizes the resulting error probability when this measurement is performed, i.e.,
it minimizes [23] [24]
Pr (error) = irotr (Aipo) + 7r1tr (bo 1 ) . (2.46)
To minimize the error probability, we convert Equation (2.46) to
Pr (error) = 7ri - tr (M 1 (7ri 1 - lropo) (2.47)
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From Equation (2.47), it is apparent that Mi should be the projection operator onto
the positive eigenvalue subspace of (7r1 1 - iroo)-and MO will then be the projection
onto the nonpositive eigenvalue subspace of (7r1#1 - 7ro&)-to minimize the error
probability. The resulting minimum error probability is [23] [24]
min Pr (error) = 1 - Ea+)), (2.48)
where { an+I are the positive eigenvalues of ( 7r1#1 - iroyo).
For our quantum illumination communication protocol we will need error-probability
results for optimum quantum reception when M independent, identically distributed
mode pairs are observed, each of which then has density operator p- or pi, so that the
overall density operator is then pM' or PM. Moreover, because these will be mixed-
state density operators, a direct evaluation of the an } is prohibitively difficult.
However, the quantum Chernoff bound,
1Pr (error) <; - exp (-Me), (2.49)
2
where c = min (tr (p'~t)), comes to the rescue, because it is known that this bound
o<t<1
is exponentially tight, i.e.,
lin ln(2 Pr (error)) (2.50)
M-*oo M
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Chapter 3
Passive Eavesdropping
In passive eavesdropping, Eve just listens to the Alice-to-Bob channel and the Bob-to-
Alice channel, but she does not inject her own light into these two channels. Although
we assume that Eve collects all photons that were not received by Alice and Bob,
which account for 90% of the total photons on the two channels when the channel
has transmissivity r = 0.1, she gets almost no information from such photons.
3.1 Passive Attack Communication Protocol
The quantum illumination communication protocol is shown schematically in Fig.3-1.
Alice transmits the signal beam from a continuous-wave SPDC source to Bob over a
lossy channel with transmissivity r, < 1, while retaining the idler beam (without loss)
for subsequent joint measurement with what she will receive from Bob. Each T-sec-
long transmission from Alice comprises M = WT > 1 signal-idler mode pairs with
average photon number NS < 1 per mode, where W is the source's phase-matching
bandwidth. Bob, for his part, applies BPSK modulation (bit value k equally likely to
be zero or one) to each T-sec-long interval of the light he receives from Alice. Then
he amplifies that -modulated light-with a phase-insensitive amplifier of gain GB and
amplified spontaneous emission noise NB photons per mode-and sends the resulting
beam back to Alice over the same transmissivity-K channel. Alice then makes a joint
return-beam/idler-beam measurement to obtain Bob's bit sequence. She does this
with the OPA receiver from [5], which, unlike the Alice's optimum quantum receiver,
has an explicit hardware realization.
Alice vacum state {5'D} Bob
O'{s.} {0B,SPDC|M O M BPSK
1~ Signal
Ml inde-pendkat motlepairs S
{idler (--.1)k6 _m
Eve RCVR| sune =,1
I {a .} (3.} ampifiron all ne
Alice vacuum statef{} Bob
Figure 3-1: Schematic of quantum-illumination two-way communication protocol-
showing modal annihilation operators-with passive-eavesdropper Eve receiving all
the light that does not reach its intended destination.
Analysis of this communication protocol requires a quantum treatment, because
the SPDC source's signal and idler outputs are entangled. For continuous-wave opera-
tion, the output beams comprise a collection of M independent, identically distributed
mode pairs with annihilation operators { s, am : 1 < m < M }. Hence their joint
density operator is
M
Psr =9 PsmIm, (3.1)
m=1
where ksmIm, the state of the asm, &Im mode pair, is a zero-mean, maximally entan-
gled Gaussian state whose Wigner-distribution covariance matrix is [6]
S 0 Cq 0
1 0 S 0 -Cq
As, = - , (3.2)
4 Cq 0 S 0
0 -Cq 0 S J
where S = 2Ns + 1 and Cq = 2/Ns(Ns + 1).
The channel from Alice to Bob is purely lossy, so the modal annihilation operators
of the light beam that Bob receives are
hBm +Sm-F - K eB,, for 1 < m < M, (3.3)
where the {dBm } are in their vacuum states. Bob first modulates the light he has
received with a BPSK information bit k that is equally likely to be 0 or 1. He then
amplifies the modulated light with a phase-insensitive amplifier whose gain is GB,
leading to the following modal annihilation operators at the amplifier's output,
'Bm = (- 1 )k G B + \GB - 16t for 1 < m < M, (3.4)
where {&Nm} are in thermal states with (&Nm&m) = NB/(GB - 1) > 1. Finally,
Bob transmits the amplified modulated light back to Alice through the Bob-to-Alice
channel, i.e., the same purely lossy channel as the Alice-to-Bob channel, so that the
modal annihilation operators of the light beam Alice receives are
aRm = &'Bm + V1 - K iAm, for 1 < m < M, (3.5)
where the {dAm } are in their vacuum states. Combining these formulas, &R, is found
to satisfy
&Rm = (- 1 )k NGBra&Sm+(-1)k GBVf 1 - S2Bm+ \/GB - 16v m+v/1- K2Am-
(3.6)
Because { &sm, d., BBm, Am y t Nm } are in a zero-mean jointly Gaussian state, and
because the transformation in (3.6) is linear, we know that {&am, aIm } are in zero-
mean jointly Gaussian state when k is known. It is easily shown that this joint
state is the tensor product of M independent, identically-distributed (iid) zero-mean,
jointly Gaussian mode-pair states characterized by the Wigner-distribution covariance
matrix
A 0 (-1)kC 0
A(k) 1 0 A 0 (l)k+ 1 Ca (37)
R 4 (-l)kCa 0 S 0
0 (1)k+1Ca 0 S
where A _ 2K2 GBNS + 2KNB + 1 and Ca iq Uv C.
Assuming Eve receives all photons that Alice and Bob miss in the communication
process, we have that Eve collects M iid mode pairs whose annihilation operators,
{6sm, 6Rm :1 <m < M }, satisfy
CS. = /1 - K &Sm - / B. (3.8)
aR. = N/1 - K h'Bm - BAm. (3.9)
The joint state for each mode pair Eve receives is again zero-mean and jointly Gaus-
sian given k, but its Wigner-distribution covariance matrix is
D 0 (-I)kCe 0
A(k) 1 0 D 0 (-1)kCe (310)CSCR 4 (-)kCe 0 E 0
0 (-l)kCe 0 E
where D = 2(1 - r,)Ns +1, Ce = 2(1- K)v',GB Ns, and E 2(1 - I)KGBNs +2(1 -
K)NB + 1.
We will allow Eve to use the optimum (minimum error-probability) quantum
receiver for deciding whether Bob's bit was 0 or 1, even though no known physical
implementation is available for this receiver. On the other hand, we will only allow
Alice to use the OPA receiver, which is a sub-optimum approach, whose realization
is known. In both cases, we shall employ error-probability bounds, because-at least
for Eve-the exact performance is too difficult to compute.
Specifically, for the minimum error-probability decision between M iid mode pairs
with each mode pair having either density operator p(O) or 3(1), we have the upper
bound
Pr(e) Ie-Mnaxo<., E(s) (3.11)
2
and the lower bound
Pr(e) > -(1 - v1 - e- 2 ME(1/ 2 )), (3.12)
2
where S(s) = -
Equation (3.11) is the quantum Chernoff bound [231, which is known to be expo-
nentially tight. Its s = 1 version
21
Pr(e) e 1 -ME(1/2) (3.13)
2
is known as the Bhattacharyya bound, and is generally loose but often more conve-
nient, especially if analytical results are desired. When p(O) and p3() are Gaussian
states, Pirandola and Lloyd [25] have shown how to compute these bounds in terms
of the symplectic decompositions of pO and pm.
The interesting operating regime for the quantum illumination communication
protocol is when , < 1, Ns < 1, and NB > 1, i.e., lossy propagation, low-brightness
source, and high-brightness noise. Here it has been shown [6] that s = 1 maximizes
the error exponents for Alice and Eve's optimum quantum receivers with
Pr(e)Alice < e -4MF'GBNS/NB (3.14)2
and
Pr(e)Eve K e 4M(1-)GN/N. (3.15)
Because Ns < 1, there is an enormous disparity-in favor of Alice-in these
bounds. However, we will only allow Alice to use a realizable receiver, in which she
uses an OPA to obtain modes with annihilation operators
' = C dr+ /GA -1&t, for 1 < m < M, (3.16)
and then makes a minimum error-probability decision based on the photon-counting
measurement M 't &'_ with GA = 1+ Ns/v/NINB. As a result, the Bhattacharyya
bound on her receiver's performance is
exp(-2MKGBNs/NB)
Pr(e)Alice < 2 (3.17)2
which is only 3 dB inferior in error exponent to the optimum quantum receiver, and
still better than Eve's receiver performance.
Figure 3-2 shows the immunity that this protocol offers to passive eavesdropping,
viz., it plots upper and lower bounds on the error probability of Eve's optimum
quantum receiver when she collects all of Alice's light that does not reach Bob and all
of Bob's light that does not reach Alice. Also included are upper bounds on Alice's
error probabilities with her optimum quantum receiver and her OPA receiver. With
W = 1 THz, T = 20 ns and the remaining parameters as shown in the figure, Bob
can communicate to Alice at 50 Mbit/s with an OPA receiver at an error probability
less than 5.1 x 10~7, while Eve's optimum quantum receiver has an error probability
bounded between 0.28 and 0.46. Neglecting all other losses, the n = 0.1 transmissivity
between Alice and Bob corresponds to this communication being carried out over
50 km of low-loss (0.2 dB/km) fiber.
3.2 Information Disparity between Alice and Eve
Mutual information is another important specification of the receiver, as it indicates
how much information the receiver can get per channel use. As discussed in the
previous section, Alice's error probability is much smaller than Eve's. Intuitively, we
expect the mutual information between Alice and Bob to be much higher than that
between Eve and Bob. However, as Alice's and Eve's receivers operate in different
0-5 Eve's opt rcvr
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Figure 3-2: Error-probability bounds for Ns = 0.004, r = 0.1, and GB = NB = 10.
Solid curves: Chernoff upper bounds for Alice and Eve's optimum quantum receivers.
Dashed curve: error-probability lower bound for Eve's optimum quantum receiver.
Dot-dashed curve: Bhattacharyya upper bound for Alice's OPA receiver.
regimes, the computation of these two mutual informations is different.
In particular, we can say that the secure information that Alice receives per chan-
nel use equals her Shannon information with Bob minus Eve's Holevo information
with Bob.
As we focus on Alice's OPA receiver, whose implementation is known, we calculate
the Shannon information for Alice,
I (X; Y) = E Px,y (x, y) log (,Ji (X ) (3.18)
yY Px ) Py (y)
where X is the input random variable at Bob's terminal and Y is the output random
variable from Alice's OPA receiver. However, this equation is not the most convenient
method to compute Alice's information. Instead, we can simplify the process by
writing I (X; Y) in terms of output entropy and conditional entropy,
I (X; Y) = H (Y) - H (YIX). (3.19)
Due to the symmetry of the system, Y will be equally likely to be 0 or 1, so that
H (Y) = 1, (3.20)
1
where we are using base-2 logarithms for H (Y) = - Z Pr (y) log 2 (Pr (y)). We also
y=o
have that {YIX = 0} and {YIX = 1} are 0 - 1 random variables, with their error
probabilities being the false alarm probability, PF, and miss probability, PM, respec-
tively. So we can express the conditional entropy as
H (YIX = 0) = -PFlOg 2 (PF) - (1 - PF) 10 2 (1 - PF) (3.21)
H (YIX = 1) = -PMlog 2 (PM) - (1 - PM) lOg 2 (1 - PM),
and H (YIX) = 1 [H (Y|X = 0) + H (Y|X = 1)].
To find the false-alarm and miss probabilities, we will exploit the high average
M
photon number in N = E ',a'm that will be present under both X = 0 and X = 1
m=1
by approximating the conditional photocount statistics by Gaussian distributions.
Taking those to have conditional means N0 and Ni and conditional variance of2 and
o2, we will use a threshold test
X=0
N >< 7, (3.22)
X=1
where X denotes the decoded symbol, and y is chosen to achieve PF = PM =
Q -) with Q (z) = 00  e_ 2 12dt.
Fig.3-3 shows the Gaussian approximation, Bhattacharyya upper bound and Bhat-
tacharyya lower bound for Alice's OPA receiver. As we can see from the figure, the
error probability is around 106 when M = 1.4 x 104 , Ns = 0.004, n = 0.1, and
GB = NB = 104 . It follows that Alice's information is
I (X; Y) ~ 1 bit/use (3.23)
at this operating point, although we will use the full Gaussian-approximation error-
probability formula later.
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Figure 3-3: Error-probability performance of Alice's OPA receiver for Ns = 0.004,
r = 0.1, and GB = NB = 104. Solid curve: Gaussian approximation for Pr(e). Dashed
curve: Bhattacharyya upper bound for Pr(e). Dot-dashed curve: Bhattacharyya
lower bound for Pr(e).
Because Eve can use optimum quantum reception across a sequence of channel
uses, we need to evaluate the Holevo information she gains from her passive eaves-
dropping, namely [26]
X = M S () - s (o- 1S i) (3.24)
1 2 2
1
for p3 = - (po + pi), where po and ,1 are the joint density operators for one of Eve's2
iid mode pairs -es and aR, and S (p) = -tr (p) log2 (p) is the von Neumann entropy.
Von Neumann entropy is difficult compute for general mixed states. However,
if the state is Gaussian, the process is straightforward. For example, po and #1 are
Gaussian states, and we can transform these two states into thermal states with
average photon numbers No and N1 via symplectic transformations, which are also
unitary transformations. Moreover, unitary transformations do not change von Neu-
mann entropy, and the von Neumann entropies of the thermal states obtained from
the symplectic transformations of yo and pi are,
9 (Nk) =(N + 1) log 2 (N + 1) - Nk log2 (Nk), for k = 0, 1. (3.25)
1
Although po and 1j are Gaussian states, p = 1 (po + #1) is not. Nevertheless, we2
can obtain an upper bound on S (p) with the von Neumann entropy of a Gaussian
state, because a Gaussian state maximizes the von Neumann entropy for the same
Wigner covariance matrix [27]. The Wigner-distribution covariance matrix of p& is
D 0 (-l)kCe 0
A(k) 1 0 D 0 (-1)Ce (3.26)
CSCR4 (_l)kCe 0 E 0
0 (-l)kCe 0 E
for k = 0,1. Due to the linearity of the trace operation, the Wigner-distribution
covariance matrix of p is
DO 0 0
1 ODO 0
A = -(3.27)
4 0 0 E 0
0 0 0 E
From (3.27), we see that a two-mode product thermal state, jA, with and2
2 photons on average in each individual mode has the same Wigner-distribution
covariance matrix A. Thus we get the upper bound on Eve's Holevo information
x= M [S (p) - S (po) - IS P1]
; M [S (pA) - IS (po) - jS (pi)].
In Fig.3-4, we have plotted, versus the number of modes M, Alice's Shannon
information, the upper bound on Eve's Holevo information and the difference between
them for a single channel use. The curves assume Ns = 0.004, r. = 0.1, and GB =
NB = 104 . We see that Alice's Shannon information rises much faster than the upper
bound on Eve's Holevo information, with the maximum difference between them
occurring between M = 5 x 103 and M = 2 x 104.
Because we have used an upper bound on Eve's Holevo information, the solid
curve in Fig.3-4 is a lower bound on Alice's information advantage. At its peak,
this lower bound exceeds 0.9 bit/channel use, which is not far from the maximum 1
bit/channel use that could be achieved with binary modulation.
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Figure 3-4: Alice's Shannon information and upper bound on Eve's Holevo informa-
tion per channel use for Ns = 0.004, r, = 0.1, and GB = NB = 10 4 . Solid curve:
Lower bound between Alice's Shannon information and Eve's Holevo information.
Dashed curve: Shannon information for Alice's OPA receiver. Dot-dashed curve:
upper bound on Holevo information for Eve's optimum quantum receiver.
Before moving on to our treatment of active attacks, it is important to note a key
characteristics of the passive-attack we have mentioned. First, although the enor-
mous performance disparity is due to Alice's having employed entangled signal and
idler beams, all of the entanglement is destroyed by the Alice-to-Bob-to-Alice chan-
nel. In other words, the joint state of the ^Rm and hI. modes is classical, i.e., it is
a random mixture of coherent states. The reason that Alice's receiver vastly outper-
forms Eve's is because the strong-than-classical phase-sensitive cross correlation-the
off-diagonal elements in As--of the SPDC source yields a much stronger (although
classical) phase-sensitive cross correlation between &Rm and &rm than the correspond-
ing phase-insensitive cross correlation between cRm and 6sm that is available to Eve.
In particular, this is seen in the off-diagonal elements of ARI which are much stronger
than those of AcscR when N, < 1.
3.3 Alternative Receivers
In this section, we investigate some alternative receivers for Alice to see if we can
achieve a better error exponent than she realizes with the OPA receiver.
First, we consider the dual-output OPA receiver, which jointly detects both out-
puts of the OPA to acquire the information bits. Suppose the measured photon-
number on the mth mode for each individual output is Nj (m), where i = 0, 1 repre-
sents Bob's information bit, and j = 0,1 represents the index of the OPA outputs.
Then the { E [Ni (m)] }, the average photon number in the jth output of the OPA
given i, are given by
E [Nf(m)] = (GA - 1) (1 + GANB + GBNSK 2 ) + GANS
+2(-1)'(GA 
--1)GAGBNS(Ns + 1)
E [Ni(m)] = (GA - 1) (1 + Ns) + GA(NBn + GBNs, 2 )
+2(-1)'rsV(G,- 1)GAGBNS(NS + 1).
Furthermore, the covariance matrix of the { N (m) },for j = 0, 1 is
Ai = - N, (3.30)
where a,9 = E [Nio(m) ] (E [Nio(m)]I + 1), ail = E [Nil (m) ] (E [Nil(m) ]+ 1), and
i = (GA- 1)GA (1+ NB' + Ns (1± GBK2 ) ± ( _)i(2GA - 1),xrGBNs(1 + Ns)).
Ideally, we would like to have a closed-form expression for the error probability, from
which we could find the optimum value of GA. However, as we can see from the ex-
pression for E [NJ(m)], this output is very noisy due to the GA(NB1,+GBNSK2 ) term.
Thus we do not expect to gain much by optimizing GA. So, because it appears impos-
sible to get a closed-form expression for the error probability in the two-dimensional
case, we will continue to use the GA value from the single-output OPA receiver,
Ns1 + . We expect that the error probability we obtain should be close to the
KxNB
optimum value.
To calculate the error probability, we need to find the joint photon-counting dis-
tribution for all M modes when either i = 0 or i = 1 is sent. Defining
M
X = Nf (n) (3.31)
m=1
and
M
Y= E N,1 (m) (3.32)
m=1
when i is sent, we use the Central Limit Theorem to approximate the conditional
distributions. We are seeking by the two-dimensional Gaussian
T
1x - M E [ Ni| _ x - M E [ Ni]
exp -gA-'
y - ME [Ni] ' y - ME [N]
PXYli (x, yli) = 27r|Ai,Mi 1 /2  333)
where Ai,M = MAi, and we have used the fact that the modes are independent and
identically distributed to obtain the means and covariance matrix of X and Y from
the modal means and covariance matrix.
Using the preceding joint distributions, we constructed the likelihood-ratio test
and found the false-alarm and miss probabilities, PF and PM, by performing the
following integrations numerically:
PF dxdypx,yi (x, yi= 0) (3.34)
(XIY)EZi
and
PM = drdypxygi (x, yli = 0), (3.35)
(x,y)EZo
where Zo and Z1 are the X-Y plane decision region for receiving a 0 or a 1 respectively.
Figure 3-5 shows Alice's error probability for the single-output OPA receiver and
the dual-output receiver. The abscissa is the logarithm of the number of modes
employed, and the ordinate is the logarithm of the error probability, which is the
Gaussian approximation of the true error probability. As we can see from the figure,
the error exponent improvement is negligible for the dual-output OPA receiver. The
reason why the improvement is so small is that only one output of the OPA has
high signal-to-noise ratio, while the other output is very noisy. Thus adding another
output has little effect on error probability performance.
Next, we consider the beam-splitter heterodyne receiver, which takes &R and a,
as the inputs and detects a single output, b, to acquire the information bit k, as
illustrated in Fig.3-6, where r7 is the transmittivity of the beam splitter.
As Fig.3-6 shows, we jointly detect both quadratures of b, and optimize rq. The
Wigner-covariance matrix for b when Bob's message bit is k is
1 V(k) 1,) (k)(1, 2)V(k) - V(k) for k =0, 1 (3.36)
bk 4 (k (k
where V(k)(1 2 ) - V(k)( 2 , 1) = 0,
Vk)( 1 1) = 1+2Nsr/+2NB(1-r/)+2G s + Ns)(1 - r)r,
(3.37)
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Figure 3-5: Error Probability for Alice's OPA receiver
GB = NB = 104 . Dashed curve: single-output OPA
output OPA receiver.
4.5
for Ns = 0.004, K = 0.1, and
receiver. Solid curve: dual-
and
Vk)( 2 2) = 1+2Nsr/+2NB(1~r/)t+2GBNs(1 -)2_g(__1)kn y/GBNs(1 + Ns)(1 - 7),-
(3.38)
As we can see from the matrix, V(k)(1, 1) and V(k)(2, 2) are different, so they are not
the symplectic spectrum, and we need to find the symplectic transformation matrix to
convert the covariance matrix into the standard symplectic form whose two diagonal
elements are equal. Using
Sk =
(V(k) (11 1/4
V(k)(2,2)
0
0
(3.39)
as the symplectic transformation matrix, we can find the symplectic spectrum, and
LO "2(ut
Figure 3-6: Schematic of Alice's Beam Splitter Receiver.
then we can compute the error exponent for the quantum Chernoff bound
8MGBr 2 (1 - r/)r/Ns
e = - (3.40)______(1 + 2NBK(l - r1))2
where the optimum ri is
1+ 2NBn
r/= .+(3.41)2(1+NBK)
Plugging equation 3.41 into equation 3.40, we can get the beam-splitter optimized
error exponent
2MGBNsK2  MGBNsK
Ct = -~ - (3.42)1 + 2NBK NB
which is 6 dB inferior to that of the OPA receiver.
Finally, we investigate the joint heterodyne receiver for aR and &I. From equation
(2.32) and Wigner-covariance matrix (3.7), we can derive the conditional probability
density functions of the four outputs, (aRl, aO2ari, a12), under two hypotheses for
one mode-pair:
D ("1+o2 +2E(aI 2 aR 2 -- I1atR1)+F(aR +,R2)
Po (OR1, aR2, ail, a12) = e2G , (3.43)
(2eD a+2) +2E(aiaR1 -aI2QR2)+F(a2+cR2)
Pi (a-l1, aR2, aai, a12) = e2 (3.44)ir 2G
where D = 1 + KNB + n2GBNs, E = rVGBNs(1+ Ns) , F 1 + Ns, and
G = 1 + rNB + (1 + r.NB)Ns. From these two joint probability density functions,
we conclude that aI2CR2 - aIlkR1 is the sufficient statistic. Its mean values are
- GsNs(1+Ns) and n GBNs(1 + Ns) under two hypotheses. Moreover, its
variance is the same under both hypotheses, and equal to 1(1 + Ns)(1 + KNB +
2K2 GBNS). As a result, using the Central Limit Theorem approximation for the M
mode-pair statistics, we get the error probability expression
Pr(e)= Q .BNS) (3.45)
1+ rNIB+ 2r2GBNs
For NB = GB > 1, and Ns < 1, this yields an error exponent
MGBNsti
Ehet - N (3.46)
NB
which is, as we found for the beam-splitter receiver, 6 dB inferior to that of the
single-output OPA receiver.
None of the alternative receivers we have studied provide any appreciable re-
duction in error probability as compared to the single-output OPA receiver. This
behavior is summarized in Fig.3-7. Here we have plotted the Central Limit Theorem
approximation for the error probability of the single-output OPA receiver, and the
heterodyne receiver for -R and aI, along with upper (Chernoff) and lower (Bhat-
tacharyya) bounds on the performance of the beam-splitter receiver. Even though
the beam-splitter receiver's lower bound is slightly below the error probability of the
OPA receiver, that is not a true performance advantage in that the Bhattacharyya
lower bound is known to be loose.
Not shown in Fig.3-7 is the performance of the dual-output OPA receiver. As
argued earlier in this section, its performance-in the practical range of interest-is
not significantly better than that of the single-output OPA receiver.
Alice's Receiver Performance
Heterodyne Receiver
-10-
OPA Receiver
-15 -
Beam Splitter Receiver Bound
-20
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Logio M
Figure 3-7: Error probabilities for Alice's several practical receivers assuming Ns =
0.004, r, = 0.1, and GB = NB = -0. Dotted curve: heterodyne receiver for &R and
dr. Solid curve: single-output OPA receiver. Dashed and dot dashed curves: upper
and lower bounds for single-output beam splitter receiver.
3.4 M-ary Modulation Technique
So far, our work with quantum-illumination based secure communication has been
limited to binary phase-shift keying. The security of this approach-against both
passive and active eavesdropping-relies on the use of a low brightness (Ns < 1)
source. In conventional optical communications, the error probability at a fixed data
rate can be reduced by increasing the source strength at constant bandwidth, i.e.,
increasing source brightness. For quantum illumination, however, we must increase
the source bandwidth so that M = WT, the number of mode pairs, is increased if we
want to reduce the error probability at constant data rate. Because BPSK has a data
rate equal to 1/T, maintaining a constant error probability at increasing data rate in
our BPSK quantum illumination system requires an increase in bandwidth. Physical
limitations on the phase-matching bandwidth of an SPDC source, as well as band-
width limits in propagation media, then restrict the data rate we can effectively make
use of in BPSK quantum illumination. In an attempt to circumvent that bandwidth
limit, we now explore the use of M-ary modulation (M > 2) in quantum-illumination
based communication.
Let us consider quadrature phase-shift keying
aR as
(QPSK), in which we can express
aR zk K2 + (i)k _ 1 B + GB - 10v/1 N + 1 - eKA, (3.47)
where k = 0, 1,2, 3 is Bob's data. The OPA receiver cannot be used for QPSK
modulation because it cannot distinguish k = 1 and k = 3 in that their photon-
counting statistics are identical. The same argument applies to the joint homodyne
receiver that measures Re (aR) and Re (- 1). Likewise, a joint homodyne receiver that
measures Im (aR) and Im (-a) will not be able to distinguish k = 0 and k = 2, because
they give identical measurement statistics in this case. Heterodyne detection of aR
and a1 does, however, permit full QPSK reception. For such a measurement, with
x = [aiRl, a2, aI, a 1 2]T, we have the following conditional probability densities given
the QPSK message value k:
exp (-IXTAo-lX)
PxIk(Xlk = 0) = (2w2 2 1/2(2zr)2|Ao1/
exp (-IXTAijlX)
Px~k(XIk = 1) = (2) 22 1/2(27r) |Ail
exp (-1XTA X)Pxlk(Xlk = 2) _ 22 1A2111(27r) | A2| /
exp (-IXTA 3 1X)Pxlk(Xlk = 3) = 2 2 1) 2  :(27r)2 |A3|1/
(3.48)
(3.49)
(3.50)
(3.51)
where
F
0
I
0
F 0 -I 0
0 F 0 I
A2 =
-I 0 G 0
0 1 0 G
F 0 0 -I
0 F -I 0
A3 =
0 -1 G 0
-I 0 0 G
with F = { (1 + rNB + x2 GBNS), G = { (1+ Ns), and I
(3.52)
(3.53)
(3.54)
(3.55)
= { VGBNs (1 + Ns).
Assuming Bob's quaternary symbols are equally likely, maximum-likelihood re-
ception minimizes Alice's error probability. In particular, she uses the decision rule
choose k = 1 as Bob's message when Pxik (XIk = 1) = max Prik (XIk). The decision
k
region for Ho for a single mode-pair can then be shown to be
CI1&R1 - 12aR2 > 0
QIl&R1 - 0I2aR2 > aIllR2 + I2aRl (3.56)
QI1&R1 - U120 R2 > -(ciI1aR2 + 12aR1)-
Similarly, the decision region for H1 for a single mode-pair is
aIlaR2 + aE2CR1
aI1aR2 + aI2CeRi
aIaR2 + aI2aR1
0
aI1a~R1 - a12aR2
-(aeI1aR1 - a112aZR2),
that for H2 is
0 I1aR1 -
aIlaRl -
aI1OR1 -
CeI2CeR2
CYI2CeR2
0I2aR2
aIlfR2 + aI2CRl
-(aIlaR2 + Ce12aR1),
and the one for H3 is
aIaCeR2
CIiaR2
aIlaR2
+ aI2aR1 < 0
+ CkI2aR1 < aIiaR1 - aI20R2
+ aI2aRl < -(a!IlaR1 - a12aR2).
To visualize these decision regions for M' mode pairs, let us define
#m= azimaRim -- a12maR2m,
7m = aIimaR2m + a12aR1m,
M'
#3 = # m,
m=1
and
M'
-Y = 7m. -
m=1
The detection regions, using all the mode pairs, are then
decide HO when # > 171
decide H1 when - > 1#|
decide H2 when # < -|I|
decide H3 when -y < -|#|,
(3.57)
(3.58)
(3.59)
(3.60)
(3.61)
(3.62)
(3.63)
as shown in Fig.3-8.
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Figure 3-8: Decision regions for QPSK quantum illumination with heterodyne detec-
tion
Because QPSK transmits 2 bits per symbol while BPSK system transmits 1 bit
per symbol, we use M'= 2M mode pairs for QPSK versus M mode pairs for BPSK
to compare their error probabilities at equal data rates in bits/sec. Because M' > 1,
we shall employ the Central Limit Theorem to treat # and 7, which determine the
decision regions, as jointly Gaussian random variables given k. Thus, to evaluate
their full statistics it suffices to find their conditional means, conditional variances,
and conditional covariance given k. We find that these conditional moments are as
follows. For k = 0, we have
(#) = M'K GBNs(1 + Ns)
(A3 2 ) = -"(1 + Ns)(1 + K(NB + 2GBNsK))
(7) = 0 (3.64)
(A72) = -1(1 + Ns)(1 + NBI)
(LA/3A-y) = 0;
for k = 1,
(#3) = 0
(A3 2) = ((1 + Ns)(1 + NBr)
(-y) = M'rGBNs(1 + Ns)
(A'y 2 ) =( + Ns)(1+ (NB + 2GBNsl,))
(,AOA&y) = 0;
for k = 2,
(#3) =-M's GBNs(1 + Ns)
{A# 2)= ( + Ns)(1 + K(NB + 2GBNs,))
(Y) =0 (3.65)
(Ay 2) = (1 + NS)(1+ NB)
(AA = 0;
and for k = 3,
(#3) = 0
(A# 2 ) = L(1 + Ns)(1 + NBr)
{) =-MI's GBNs(1 + Ns)
(622) = j( + Ns)(1 + K(NB + 2GBNs,))
=A3y 0.
Because NB > 2GBNSK, we have (A0 2 ) (&y2 ) for all four k values. Thus we
can approximate the QPSK decision problem as one of deterministic QPSK symbols
in additive white Gaussian noise. By rotating the 3--y coordinates by 450 to obtain
zi and z2 , we get the QPSK problem shown in Fig. 3-9, with ~ M'r/IGBNs/2,
where we have used Ns < 1.
The scalar components of the additive white Gaussian noise in this case have
variances
2 2 1
Z1 = aZ2 = M'(1+ NB'), (3.66)
where we have again used Ns < 1. It is now easily shown that the QPSK symbol-error
k=1 0
k=2 0
o k=0
0 k=3
Figure 3-9: QPSK signal constellation
probability is
Pr (e K | 2Q M'nGBNsP(e)QPSK NB Q2 M'GBNs2 ' NB (3.67)
where we have assumed rNB > 1.
Let us compare these results with those we have acquired for BPSK with the OPA
receiver, the homodyne receiver, and the heterodyne receiver. In doing so, we shall
concentrate on low error-probability operation, i.e., M'IGBNS/NB > 1, so that
Pr (e)QPSK 2Q ( |M''GBNsNB ) exp (M'KGBNS(i e~p2NB
We shall also compare quaternary symbol error probabilities, so that for BPSK
Pr (e)BPSK r 2 Pr (bit error) - Pr2 (bit error) 2 Pr (bit error)
Sexp (2MKGBNS exp M'KGBNs (3.69)
NB \~ NB
(3.68)
--- C
From these two equations, we can conclude that QPSK with heterodyne detection
does not gain any advantage over BPSK with OPA receiver. On the contrary, the
symbol error rate of QPSK has a 3 dB higher error exponent than that of BPSK at
the same data rate.
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Chapter 4
Active Eavesdropping
It is evident from Fig. 1-2 that Eve can easily probe the state of Bob's BPSK modulator
by injecting her own light into Bob via the Alice-to-Bob channel, and then detect the
modulated, amplified, and noisy version of that light that is present in the Bob-to-
Alice channel. Because Fig.1-2 presumes that all of the losses encountered by Alice
and Bob are really due to Eve's beam splitter, Eve's active eavesdropping attack is
exceedingly powerful. In addition to injecting her own light into the channel, Eve
can, in general, modify the Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Alice transmissivity in trying
to mask her intrusion. So, to minimize their vulnerability to such an attack, Alice
and Bob should do the following four things: (1) Bob should use optical filtering
to prevent Eve from accessing his BPSK modulator with an out-of-band signal, i.e.,
one whose spectrum does not overlap Alice's. (2) Alice and Bob should monitor the
physical integrity of the propagation channels connecting them, e.g., using optical
time-domain reflectometers (OTDRs) on fiber links, to bound Eve's optical couplings
to Bob and Alice's terminals. (3) Alice and Bob should employ optical power monitors
and optical spectrum analyzers to detect appreciable deviations-in total power or
power spectral density-from what they would expect in the absence of Eve. (4)
Alice should employ a bit error rate (BER) monitor, to sense appreciable changes
from the performance she would expect in the absence of Eve. As a summary, Eve
can modify the transmittivity of the Alice-to-Bob channel, which is redefined as rB,
the transmittivity of Bob-to-Alice channel, which is redefined as r1 A, and choose the
quantum state she injects into the channel. On the other hand, Alice and Bob use
power monitors and a BER detector to counteract such modifications.
The optimum quantum state for Eve's active attack is not known. However, our
passive eavesdropping analysis has already shown that using the signal beam from
an SPDC source-while retaining the idler for a joint measurement-outperforms all
classical states of the same average photon number. Thus we will assume that Eve
uses SPDC light for her attack. Moreover, to avoid the detection by a spectrum
analyzer, she will use the same phase-matching bandwidth as Alice, with NE < 1
photons per mode. Suppose, for now, that Eve does not change the channel trans-
mittivities. Then, the error probability for her active attack will be
Pr(e)Eve < I e4M(1-)GBNE/NB (4.1)2
when she used the optimum quantum receiver.
If Alice and Bob cannot bound NE, then Eve's receiver can easily outperform
Alice's. Setting (3.14) equal (4.1), which means that Alice and Eve get the same op-
timum quantum receiver error-probability bound, the amount of the light Eve needs
to inject per mode is
_ _ 1
NE = Ns = -Ns, for n = 0.1. (4.2)1 - r. 9
The reason why Eve can easily outperform Alice is that Eve's transmissivity, 1 - r=
0.9, is much higher than Alice's transmissivity, , = 0.1.
Suppose that Alice and Bob want to get an error probability 10 5 with the OPA
receiver while bounding Eve's error probability to be higher than 10-1 with the OPA
receiver, then NE = -Ns satisfies the condition for r. = 0.1, when Ns, NB, M, and
GB give Alice her desired error probability. We will discuss how Alice and Bob can
constrain NE to this value in different cases while employing only 1% of the received
light for power monitoring, in order not to affect the normal communication process.
4.1 Active Case I: Eve Injects Light without Mod-
ifying Channel Transmittivities
First, consider what happens when Eve just injects her own light into the channel,
without changing KB and KA from ,. Let us see how tightly Bob can constrain Eve's
NE by means of his power monitor. We define No,m and Ni,m to be the number of
photons arriving at Bob's power monitor in the mth mode without and with Eve's
light injection respectively. Because the M modes that Bob receives are in a prod-
uct state, the {No,m} are statistically independent, identically distributed random
variables, and the {Ni,m1 } are too. Moreover, the expectation value of No,m is
1(No,m) = KNs, for 1 < m < M, (4.3)
100
and the expectation value of Nim is
(Ni,m) -. [r]s + (1 - r)NE) , for 1 < m < M, (4.4)
100
when Bob uses 1% of his received light for power monitoring. In addition, their cor-
responding variances are
(AN2m) = (No,m) ((No,m) +1) (No,m) (4.5)
and
(AN 2 m) = (Ni,m) ((Ni,m) + 1) (Ni,m), (4.6)
where the approximations follow because SPDC sources operate at very low bright-
ness, i.e, we have (No,m) < 1, and (Ni,m) < 1.
M
Bob's power monitor measures No = E No,m if Eve does not inject any light,
m=1
M
and Ni = E Ni,m if she does. Due to the Central Limit Theorem, we can approx-
m=1
imate the statistics of these random variables as Gaussian, because M > 1. Their
expectation values are
M(No) = M Ns100 (4-7)
(N1 ) = 100 [Ns + (1 - n)NE]
and their variances are
M(ANO) = - -Ns (4-8)(ANJ 100
Assume that Eve is equally likely to attack or not attack, and that Bob makes a
minimum error probability decision about her absence or presence based on the ob-
servation from his power monitor. The error probability he will then get is
Pe, / = Q (N) - (No) (1 - I)NE
'(AN12)+ (ANo2 10 (,KS+ lr.Ns + (1 - r,)NE)
(4.9)
where Q(x) f: dt*$ . To detect the attack with error probability less than 10-6,
Bob needs to monitor the power on a total of M = 2.36 x 109 modes, which takes
approximately 2.36 ms for an SPDC source with 1 THz phase-matching bandwidth.
4.2 Active Case II: Eve Modifies the Alice-to-Bob
and Bob-to-Alice Channels
Now, let us study the case in which Eve increases her injection amount by reducing
rB so that rIBNS+(1- KB)NE = rNs is the average number of photons reaching Bob.
As a result, Bob's power monitor cannot detect Eve's attack. Because making B < r,
will reduce the power that Alice couples to Bob, her error probability will increase if
Eve does nothing else. To at least partially compensate for this effect, Eve increases
the Bob's coupling to Alice from K to KA. Let us see how Alice's power monitor can
limit the extent to which Eve can increase rA. The analysis of this case is rather
similar to that for Bob's power monitor, so we use the same notation, i.e., No,. and
N1,m will be the number of photons arriving at Alice's power monitor in the mth mode
without and with, respectively, Eve's changing the Alice-to-Bob transmittivity to KB
and the Bob-to-Alice transmittivity to KA. As in the case for Bob's power monitor,
the M modes that Alice receives are in a product state, therefore, the {No,m} and the
{Ni,m} are sets of statistically independent, identically distributed random variables.
The relevant expectation values and variances are now
1(No,m) [GB 2 Ns + NB] (4.10)
100
1
(N1,m) = [GB KA rBNs + GBKA(1 - KB)NE + SANB , (4-11)100
22 NB 2(AN2,m) = (No,m) ((No,m) + 1) ~ (No,m)2  100 (4.12)
and
(AN2,m) = (Ni,m) ((Ni,m) + 1) ~~ (Ni,m)2  (KANB 2 (4.13)1, 100/
where Alice has used 1% of her received light for power monitoring, and the approx-
imations follow because the background noise is high-brightness light, whereas the
SPDC sources are low-brightness light, so that we have (No,m) ~ KNB/100 > 1 and
(Ni,m) ~KANB/1 0 0 > 1.
M
Alice's power monitor measures No = Z No,m if Eve does not change K to KA
m=1
M
on the Bob-to-Alice path and Ni = E Ni,m if she does. Again invoking the Central
m=1
Limit Theorem, we approximate the statistics of these random variables as Gaussian,
because M > 1. Their expectation values are
M MKNB(No) = - [GBKKBNs + GBK(l - KB)NE + KNB] 100100 100
(N1) ~- 10 [GBKAKBNs + GBKA(1 - KB)NE + KANB] 0
and their variances are
(AN2) = M (No,m) 2  M NB)
(AN 12) = M (Ni,m) 2  M 1NB)100
When Alice makes a minimum error probability decision about that channel modifi-
cation, based on the observation from her power monitor, under the assumption that
Eve is equally likely to leave i, alone or change r, to "A, her error probability is
PeA=Q N 1 )-No) (4.16)2(N) + ~2) \ A ;
To detect the channel modification with an error probability less than 10-6 for a
0.1% KA variation, Alice needs to monitor the power on a total of 9 x 107 modes,
which takes approximately 90 ps for an SPDC source with 1 THz phase-matching
bandwidth.
We have just seen that Alice's power monitor can readily detect any appreciable
modification Eve might make to the transmissibility of the Bob-to-Alice channel. It
turns out, however, that Eve has no real motivation to make any such modification. In
particular, the error probability bound for Alice's optimum quantum receiver, when
Eve leaves the transmissivity of the Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Alice channel unchanged
is, from (3.14),
Pr(e)Alice e -4MrGBNS/NB (4.17)
2
whereas it becomes
Pr(e)Alice < Ie-4MKBGBNS/NB (4.18)2
when she changes the Alice-to-Bob transmissivity to KB < K, to preclude Bob's
detecting her intrusion with his power monitor, and she changes the Bob-to-Alice
transmissivity to KA > . in the hope of keeping Alice's error probability unaffected
by her attack. Because Alice's error probability does not depend on KA, Eve's attack,
in this case, is exposed to two monitors, Alice's power monitor and Alice's BER
monitor. Our next step is to examine the effectiveness of Alice's BER monitor.
4.3 Active case III: Eve Injects Light Undetectable
by Power Monitoring
Suppose that Eve decides to attack in a manner that cannot be detected by Alice and
Bob's power monitors. Specifically, she reduces K to xB on the Alice-to-Bob channel
and injects NE satisfying I-BNs + (1 - KB)NE = sNs, thus defeating Bob's power
monitor. She does not modify the Bob-to-Alice transmittivity from its r value, thus
defeating Alice's power monitor. So, if Alice and Bob make no attempt to monitor the
physical integrity of the propagation channels, they must rely on Alice's BER monitor
to detect Eve's presence. Bit errors form a Bernoulli process, Let Eo,k and E1,k be
0 for a correct reception and 1 for an erroneous reception of Bob's kth bit without
(Eo,k) and with (E1,k) Eve's active attack. Since each bit Bob sends is statistically
independent and identically distributed, the {Eo,k} are statistically independent and
identically distributed random variables, and the {E1,k} are too. The mean values of
Eo,k and E1,k are Alice's error probability in the absence and presence of Eve's attack.
Moreover, the variances of Eo,k and E1,k are
(zE2,k) = (Eo,k) (1 -Eok)) (4.19)
(AE?,k) = (Elk) (1 - (Elk)
So we have
(AE02,k) (4.20)
(A E1,*) (E1,k)
when Alice's error probability is low.
K
Alice's BER monitor measures Eo = KE Eo,k if Eve does not attack the channel
k=1
K
and E0 = -L Ei, if she does. Again using the Central Limit Theorem, we ap-
k=1
proximate the statistics of these random variables as Gaussian, because we will take
K >> 1. Assume that Eve is equally likely to attack or not attack, and that Alice
makes a minimum error probability decision about her absence or presence based on
the her BER monitor's output. The error probability she will get is then
Pe,BER Q (K (El,k) - (EO,k) (4.21)
V-(Ei1e + V(E-o~
To detect the attack with error probability less than 106 for 60% BER variation,
which corresponds to 5% rGB variation for Ns = 0.004, K = 0.1, and GB = NB = 104
with the OPA receiver, Alice needs to continuously monitor the bit errors for 4 x 108
bits in order to achieve this goal. At 50 Mbit/s, such BER monitoring will take
8 sec, which is far longer than the times needed to detect Eve's intrusion when her
presence was detectable by Alice and Bob's power monitors. Thus we need to examine
ways to make Eve more detectable by Alice's BER monitor. To do so, we will later
back away from some of the extravagant capabilities that, thus far, we have assumed
Eve possesses. Before doing that, however, let us complete our treatment of the
omnipotent Eve by explaining the performance of Bob-to-Alice communication and
Bob-to-Eve eavesdropping when Eve is limited to reducing , on the Alice-to-Bob path
to a value satisfying r, > r-B 0.95r while operating in the manner that precludes
her being detected by Alice and Bob's power monitors.
Under the preceding conditions, we have that
KNs = KBNS + (1 - KB)NE (4.22)
so that
NE = Ns (4.23)181
when r = 0.1, and rIB = 0.95n.
Her corresponding Wigner-distribution covariance matrix for aR and 6, is
A 0 (- 1 )kC 0
A(k) 1 0 A 0 (-1)k+1C (4.24)
CRCI 4 (-1)kC 0 S 0
0 (-1)k+1C 0 S
where A 1 + 2NB(1 - ,) + 2GB(1 - r)(NE(1 - rIB) + NSrB), S 1 + 2NE, and
C = 2 'GBNE(1 + NE)(1 ~ PB)(1 - ii). Furthermore, the Chernoff upper bound for
Eve's optimum quantum receiver is
1 (AMGBNE(1 -'B)\
Pr(e)Eve < - exp N - (4.25)
2 NB
If, instead, Eve uses a gain GE = 1+ NE optical parametric amplifier, taking
,(1-x.)NB
a, as the signal input mode and aR as the idler input mode, and then direct detects
the information bit, then her error probability Bhattacharyya upper bound is
1 (2MGBNE(1 ~~-
Pr(e)Eve < exp - N (4.26)
2 P(NB
For NS = 4 x 10- 3, NE = 2.7 x 10-5 and GB = NB = 104 , we have plotted
results for Alice and Eve's error probability versus the number of modes in Fig.4-1.
The two dashed lines are error-probability upper bounds for Alice and Eve's OPA
receivers, and the two dot-dashed lines are the corresponding lower bounds for these
receivers. The solid lines in Fig.4-1 are error probabilities obtained from the Central
Limit Theorem. We see from the error-probabilities approximations that when Alice
achieves the error rate 10-5, Eve's error probability is approximately 0.12.
Although the results in Fig.4-1 are promising, they rely on constraining Eve to
K > KB > 0-95r, something which requires an unreasonably long-duration BER mon-
itoring on Alice's part. This occurs because we have assumed that Eve collects all the
photons from Bob that do not reach Alice. For both fiber-optic and free-optic imple-
mentation this assumption is very conservative. Optical time-domain reflectometers
can certainly limit Eve's capability in this regard on a fiber link. Likewise, visual ob-
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Figure 4-1: Alice and Eve's OPA Receiver Performance
servation of the propagation path, combined with fairly tight beam divergences can
do the same thing over a line-of-sight terrestrial channel. So, to assess the degree to
which Alice and Bob can be immune to active eavesdropping under more reasonable
assumptions about Eve's photon-capture capability, consider Fig.4-2. Here, we show
three beam splitters in the Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Alice paths with Eve only having
access to one. The first beam splitter represents the loss from Alice to Eve, and the
last beam splitter characterizes the loss from Eve to Bob. However, the middle beam
splitter accounts for how much light Eve can get from these channels. We will assume
that the overall effect of the three beam splitters on the light propagation from Alice
to Bob is a pure loss r,, with the same being true for the Bob-to-Alice path. We shall
also assume that Eve has the same K transmittivity to and from Bob.
Fig. 4-3 plots the Central Limit Theorem approximation for the error probabilities
of Alice's OPA receiver and Eve's active-attack OPA receiver. Also included is the
lower bound on Eve's passive-attack optimum quantum receiver when she collects
all the light from Alice that does not reach Bob and all the light from Bob that
does not reach Alice. The parameter used in the computation are: Ns = 4 x 10-,
NE =4x 10 4 GB = NB = 104, W = 1 THz, and , = 0.1. From the figure we see that
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Figure 4-2: Schematic of realistic quantum-illumination two-way communication pro-
tocol with active-eavesdropper Eve using an SPDC source and an OPA receiver.
Alice can achieve an error probability below 10' at 150 Mbps data rate. This error
probability is low enough that standard forward error-correction (FEC) techniques
can be used to achieve reliable communication. However, at this same 150 Mbps data
rate, the error probability of Eve's active-attack OPA receiver is 0.16, which means
her receiver cannot benefit from the FEC algorithm. Note that the error-probability
lower bound on Eve's passive attack with an optimum quantum receiver is 0.37 at
the 150 Mbps data rate, even though she receives all the light that does not reach its
intended destination. This shows how much more powerful Eve's active attack is in
comparison with her passive attack.
-5-
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Figure 4-3: Error probability versus bit rate for Alice and Eve's OPA receivers. Lower
bound on the error probability of Eve's optimum quantum receiver for passive eaves-
dropping is also included.
Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusions
In this thesis we have studied secure communication based on quantum illumination.
It has been known for more than twenty years that quantum mechanics can enable
two remote users to develop a shared secret key of random binary digits. Used as
a one-time pad by these users, they can then communicate with complete immunity
to eavesdropping. Called quantum key distribution, the protocols for creating the
shared key rely on the no-cloning theorem for their security. This thesis, however,
has addressed a very different quantum paradigm for secure communication, one
that is based on the entanglement of the signal and idler beams from a spontaneous
parametric downconverter (SPDC), rather than the no-cloning theorem. Moreover,
quantum illumination aims for secure transmission of data, whereas quantum key
distribution first creates a key that is then used for data communication.
Prior theoretical work on quantum illumination showed that Alice and Bob-the
communication parties-could enjoy an enormous (approximate 6 orders of magni-
tude) advantage over a passive eavesdropper (Eve) in a 50 Mbit/s, 50-km-long ideal-
ized fiber communication link. However, that work did not evaluate the information
rate advantage that Alice and Bob enjoy over the passive eavesdropping Eve. Thus,
the first important accomplishment of this thesis was to show that Alice's Shannon
information about Bob's message bit can exceed Eve's Holevo information about that
bit by more than 0.9 bits/channel use, confirming the security when Eve only listens to
the communication between Alice and Bob. What is remarkable about the quantum
illumination protocol is that although the loss and noise in the channel destroy the
quantum entanglement between the signal beam and the idler beam, the correlation
between the return beam and the idler beam still enables the secure communication
between Alice and Bob under passive eavesdropping.
The quantum illumination protocol is vulnerable to the active eavesdropping,
because Eve can gain the same entanglement advantage by injecting her own SPDC
light into the channel. We have evaluated a series of techniques that Alice and Bob
can use to reduce this vulnerability. These techniques limit the amount of SPDC light
that Eve can inject without being detected. With these techniques we showed that
Alice and Bob achieve an error probability advantage of about 4 order of magnitude
in comparison to Eve, although this performance presumed Eve's capabilities-with
respect to her channel coupling and her receiver technology-were more limited than
we allowed for in the passive-eavesdropping analyses.
In addition to the preceding analyses of communication security, we made several,
somewhat fruitless, attempts to improve on the basic binary-modulation, optical para-
metric amplifier (OPA) quantum-illumination protocol. Specifically, we found that
dual-OPA reception offered a minimal error probability improvement in comparison
with OPA reception, and that both beam-splitter and dual-heterodyne receivers had
appreciably worse performance than the OPA receivers. Finally, one attempt to
achieve increased data rate by going to quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) re-
vealed an error probability that was worse than that for binary phase shift keying
(BPSK).
5.2 Future Work
Currently, quantum-illumination based communication relies on the OPA receiver,
whose BPSK error exponent is known to be 3 dB worse than that of the optimum
quantum receiver. Thus the principal open theoretical problem is to find a way
to bridge that gap. A similar gap exists between the performance of conventional
coherent (homodyne and heterodyne) detection of BPSK-modulated coherent-state
light and that of the optimum quantum receiver (the Helstrom bound). The Kennedy
receiver [29], which injects a local oscillator that converts BPSK into on-off keying
(OOK) prior to direct detection, is known to be within a factor of two of the optimum
quantum receiver's performance at low error probability. The Dolinar receiver [28],
which augments the Kennedy receiver with feedback control of the local oscillator,
exactly realizes the optimum quantum receiver. Thus, lessons drawn from this earlier
work could help conceivably help in finding an improved, perhaps optimum, receiver
for quantum illumination. There are, however, some significant challenges along that
path, of which the most significant is that the Kennedy and Dolinar receivers work
for pure-state hypotheses, whereas those for quantum illumination are mixed states.
Other receiver-related problems that could be addressed arise because the OPA
receiver requires phase knowledge, i.e., the quantum illumination communication pro-
tocol involves an interferometric measurement. How to acquire the necessary phase
information may be considered in future work. It is possible that differential phase-
shift keying will be a valuable approach in this regard.
Another problem area for consideration is the use of quantum-illumination based
communication over a line-of-sight path through the atmosphere. Here there will
be spatial-mode effects and turbulence-induced fading to contend with, but visual
monitoring of the path from Alice and Bob's terminal may provide a strong limit on
Eve's ability to do active eavesdropping.
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